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ON APPEAL FROM THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
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VS: 
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FOR APPELLANT 
Albert Pete Veenstr-, Pro-Se 
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M. Scott Keim, Bar #5879 
Deputy Attorney General 
450 West State Street, 10th, fl. 
Post Office Box 83720 
Boise, Idaho 
83720-0036 
ARGUMENT OF LAW 
For purposes of brevity, the Appellant will simply touch 
upon the Respondents Brief, and will conclusively show that he 
is entitled to the interpretation of the law as is depicted for in 
the Opening Brief of Appellant as filed in this case. 
The language of the Idaho Code, ~10-1110, and ~10-1111, are 
unambiguous when they are given the ordinary meaning of the words 
used. 
The plain and the ordinary words used, in ~10-1110 states as 
follows: 
11 
•••• A lien arising from the delinquency of a payment 
due under a judgment for support of a child issued by 
an Idaho Court continues until five, (5), years after 
the death or emancipation of the last child for whom 
support is owed under the judgment unless the underlyinq 
judgment is renewed, is previously satisfied or the 
enforcement of the judgment is stayed upon an appeal as 
provided by law. The transcript or abstract above 
mentioned shall contain the title of the Court and 
cause and number of action, names of judgment creditors 
and debtors, time of entry and amount of judgment". 
By the plain meaning of the words used, the debt or lien 
which was incurred by the judgment for child support continues 
until five, (5), years after the emancipation of the child for 
whom the judgment was entered. 
In this case, that would be five, (5), years after the child 
turned eighteen years of age, or the age of 23. 
The child in question was born on  The 
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Child then reached the age of emancipation when it reached the 
eighteenth, (18), birthday. This occurred on
The Statute further provides that the lien or iudqment 
continues until five, (5), years after the date of emancipation, 
or in this case, until the 23rd birthdate of the child. This 
date is  
Finally, the statute provides that," •.. unless the judgment 
is renewed". 
This Court must then look to the Statute which covers 
"renewed iudgments". ~10-1111. 
The Idaho Code ~10-1111, (2) states as follows, 
(2) "Unless the judgment has been satisfied, 
and PRIOR to the expiration of the lien created 
in section 10-1110, Idaho Code, or any renewal 
thereof, a Court that has entered a judgment 
for child support may, upon Motion, renew such 
iudgment. The renewed iudgment, and the lien 
established thereby shall continue for ten, (10) 
years from the date of the renewed iudqment". 
The plain and unambiguous language of this statute clearly 
depicts that, " .•.. PRIOR TO THE EXPIRATION OF THE LIEN CREATED 
IN SECTION 10-1110, OR ANY RENEWAL THEREOF, .... ". 
The Judqment in this case was not satisfied. However, it 
did expire on when the child reached the 
aqe of emancipation plus five, (5), years. 
In order for a renewal of the iudqment to have taken place, 
the Motion for renewal of the judgment would have had to be 
served and filed PRIOR TO THE EXPIRATION OF THE LIEN ...... ". 
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The Appellee/Respondent in this case, not beinq happy with 
the clear and unambiquous terms of the Statute, has asked the 
Court to qo inside the leqislative minutes and perform a comprehensive 
study of the leqislative lanquaqe of the adoption code for the 
amendments to these statutes. 
Not only does this violate the principles of statutory 
interpretation, but the Respondent/Appellee has made a very 
erroneous interpretation of the legislative enactment(s). 
"Legislative intent must be determined from the plain meaninq 
of the words used, and if plain and unambiquous, direct and certain, 
the statute speaks for itself". Crist V. Seqna, 622 P.2d 1028, 1029, 
(1981). 
In this case, there is no confusing the words used, nor the 
intent of the legislature. Therefore, the statute speaks for 
itself. It was error to look further into the Statute than what 
the Statute itself said. 
The interpretation used by the Court, (At the behest of the 
Respondent), leaves a portion of the Statute meaningless. Under 
the interpretation as used by the Magistrate Judqe, and the 
Respondent/Appellee, the portion of the Statute, (10-1111, (2)), 
which states, " ..•• Prior to the expiration of the lien created in 
section 10-1110, Idaho Code, or any renewal thereof •.. ", would have 
absolutely no meaning what-so-ever, and therefore it makes the 
Idaho Code 10-1110, and 10-1111, (2), incompatible with each other. 
On the other hand, the reading as put forward by the 
Appellant, (In the Maqistrate Court), is the correct readinq of 
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the two statutes in question because in qives meaning and effect 
to all provisions of the two statutes. 
"It is well established that a Court must give meaning and 
effect to all statutory provisions". Montana Highway Contractors 
V. Department of Highways, 715 P.2d 1056, 1058, (1986). 
Under the interpretation as suggested or as used by the 
Magistrate Judge, the provisions of the Idaho Code ~10-1111, (2) 
are not allowed to have meaning at all. 
In Idaho it is well settled that, " .• in determining the 
ordinary meaning of a statute, effect must be given to all the 
words, ... so that none will be void, superfluous, or redundant". 
State V. Mercer, 143 Idaho 108, at 109, 138 P.3d 308, at 309, (2006); 
Norton V. Dept of Emp't, 94 Idaho 924, at 928, 500 P.2d 825, at 829, 
(1972). 
Instead of reading what is in the Statutes, the Magistrate 
Judge, at the request of the Respondent/Appellee, went inside of 
the legislation that created the 2011 amedments to the Statutes 
in question. 
Not only is this not the way that Statutes are interpreted, 
but it has created an impossible result. 
The Respondent/Appellee relies on the renewal language of 
Section 5, of the Act of March 22nd, 2011, Ch 104, 2011 Idaho Sess. 
Laws 267-269, (As amended by act of April 14th, 2011, ch. 331, 
2011 Sess. Laws 968), to support their claim that the Judgment in 
question can be renewed. 
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The Problem with the interpretation used by the Magistrate 
Judge is as follows: 
Section 5 of the aforementioned session laws, states as 
follows, 
" .•• this act shall be in full force and effect, •.. 
retroactively to July 1, 1995, and shall apply 
to all orders currently being enforced by the 
... department •.. such that any Idaho judgment for 
child support that would otherwise have expired 
since July 1, 1995, may be renewed on or before 
December 30, 2011". 
This language brings forth two very important facts, both 
of which effect the Jurisdiction of the Court to have renewed the 
Judgment in this case. 
First, when Section 5, (As cited above), states, " .•. judgment 
for child support that would otherwise have expired .•. ", it 
does not apply to the Appellant because his judgment DID EXPIRE. 
Section 5 is speaking in terms and in meaning of judgments that 
would have·"OTHERWISE EXPIRED". The Legislative body is talking 
about judgments that if not renewed, will expire. It is not speaking 
in terms of judgments who have ALREADY EXPIRED, such as the 
judgment in this case, that expired on 
Secondly, section 5, in it's final sentence states, " ... may 
be renewed on or before December 30, 2011". 
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DOES THE DOCTRINE OF RES JUDICATA BAR THE RENEWED JUDGMENT ACTION 
If a Judgment has become final, either because no appeal 
was taken or because appeals have been exhausted, Res Judicata will 
bar consideration of any later challenge to the Judgment, without 
regard to whether the Court that originally heard the case did so 
erroneously. Kontrick V. Ryan, 540 U.S. 443, 456 n.9, 124 S.Ct. 
906, 916, 157 L.Ed.2d 867, (2007). 
The Judgment in this case was final when it was entered on 
July 17, 1991. There was no appeal taken from that Judgment. 
The Judgment expired on More than a 
year later, the Department, (e.i., Plaintiff), has attempted to 
re-litigate the Judgment. This action is barred by the Doctrine of 
Res Judicated and or Collateral Estoppel. 
Res Judicata is an affirmative defense. Please see, Taylor 
V. Sturgell, 128 s. Ct. 2161, 171 L.Ed.2d 155, (2008). Once an 
affirmative defense is pled, and the pleading party has shown some 
evidence of the defense, (By a preponderance of the evidence), the 
burden then shifts to the adverse party to prove beyond a reasonable 
doubt, that the affirmative defense does not work to dismiss the 
action. 
In this case, it is clear that the parties are the same in 
this action as they were to this same action in 1991. It is also 
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u8i.ore the Cct:tri:.. werE: tiw oaxaci.: s~n18 issues as wa..:: before the 
Cvu.rt in 190'1, when cliE: 0rig:i.i1al Judgiilt2nt was e11tGred. 
In 1991 the Appellee prevailed. Unfortunately, the Appellee 
allowed the judgment to expire without renewing it in a timely 
manner, and that action makes it impossible for this Court or 
any Court to renew the judgment. The action of allowing the 
judgment to expire, and then attempting to relitigate the facts 
and or the judgment itself, would violate the principles of Res 
Judicata, and or Collateral Estoppel. 
THE APPELLANT WAS ENTITLED TO HAVE DEFAULT JUDGMENT ENTERED 
The District Court Clerk's Report of Action clearly shows 
that the Appellant sought a default judgment against the Appellee. 
The Appellant also Moved the Court to set for a hearing his 
Motion for entry of default judgment. This is also made clear by 
the District Court Clerk's Report of Action. The Motion for entry 
of default judgment, ( Motion for a hearing), was filed in the 
District Court Clerk's Office on March 5th, 2012, and it does 
FIi 
in fact appear in the Clerk's Report of Action. 1 
The Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 54, (c), makes the 
following provision: 
"The default Judgment provisions of this rule 
embodies the essentials of Due Process and 
Fundamental fairness and of fair play". 
Johnson V. Hartford ins., 99 Idaho 134, 
578 P.2d 676, (1978). 
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part of the Clerks Record on Appeal, but 
is noted as .being filed on 03/05/12, of 
the ROA, on page 3 of the Clerks Record 
on appeal. 
How has this "fair play" been granted to the Appellant 
when he is held to certain standards and rules but the Respondent 
is not? If the Appellant would have been late in filinq a 
document, it is a guarantee that the Court would have entered 
iudgment against him. 
The Appellant is a prisoner, with absolutely no access to 
any case law, and very limited access to Court Rules. The Respondent 
seems to rely upon cases where one party is not a prisoner to 
arque that, 11 ••• in Idaho pro-se filings are held to the same 
standards as attorney's". This is simply not applicable to Pro-Se 
PRISONER"S. Irregardless of the state of Idaho law, the law from 
the United States Supreme Court in the case of Haines V. Kerner, 
404 u.s. 519, 92 s.ct. 594, 30 L.Ed.2d 652, (1972), that has 
established that pro-se Prisoners are held to the less stringent 
standards of the law. 
This is based upon the fact that States, by and through the 
different offices, will take advantage of prisoners who have no 
type of case law available to them, who have no access to books 
to ascertain deadlines, and proper procedures, and thereby these 
inmate's would automatically lose in Court. 
This falls squarely into this case. The Respondent is taking 
advantage of this situation. In Idaho it violates policy for inmates 
to possess case law. (It is not available to inmates). There is 
no Law Library. There are no legal resources to conduct research. 
(By policy). And yet the Respondent would hold that the Appellant 
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is to be held to the same standards as an attorney. It makes no 
sense at all. 
The Appellant did not initiate this proceedinq. It was the 
Respondent who is attemptinq to "Time travel" and re-open a case 
that was expired. 
The Respondent is an assistant Attorney General for the 
State of Idaho. He knows that the Appellant can not possibly have 
his documents in the same form as an attorney; because he knows 
that inmates are not allowed to have case law, and that there is 
no law library for inmates to use. 
In short, the Appellant properly souqht default iudgment, 
and the Court abused it's discretion when it failed to rule on 
that Motion. 
CONCLUSION 
The Appellant has shown that certain portions of the laws of 
the State of Idaho would be made meaninqless under the interpretation 
of the Statutes as the Respondent would have this Court rule. 
The Appellant's arqument is concise and is in conformity to 
the laws of the State of Idaho. 
Based upon the arguments as put forward by the Appellant in 
the Opening brief of Appellant, it is clear that this Court should 
qrant to the Appellant the Relief he souqht. 
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OATH OF APPELLANT 
Comes now, Albert Pete Veenstra, III, who avers and states 
that he has read the enclosed Reply Brief of Appellant. That he 
Knows the contents thereof and believes them 
correct to the best of his belief. 
_1l_lfr JVYf7 
Affiert Pet~ Veenstra, III Pro-S 
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to be true and 
f-.27-)3 
Dated 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I, Albert Pete Veenstra, III, do Certify that I served a 
copy of the enclosed Reply Brief of Appellant, upon the parties 
entitled to such service by depositing a copy of the said same 
in the Un i ted States Mail, First Class Postage pre-paid and 
addressed as follows: 
M. Scott Keim 
Office of the Att. Gen 
Post Office Box 83720 
Boise, Idaho 
83720-0036 
t; 21~ I> 
/ ~ r-tJ,(j -
Albert Pee eenstra, III, ~ro-Se 
Clerk of the Court 
Idaho State Supreme Court 
Post Office Box 83720 
Boise, Idaho 
83720-0101 
r ~tJ. 1-13 
Dated 
